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Intellectual Property Protection and Offshore Software 
Development 
An Analysis of the U.S. Software Industry 
 
Horacio Teran* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1992, Bill Gates said, “take our twenty best people away 
and I tell you that Microsoft would become an unimportant 
company.”1  Software developers are critical to software 
companies and are generously rewarded for their services.  The 
“fast track” to wealth attracts software developers from around 
the world to work for firms in the United States.  Among 
Fortune magazine’s richest Americans under the age of forty 
are three men of East Indian origin: Naveen Jain, 39, of 
Infospace, Sanjay Kumar, 32, of Computer Associates and 
Mukesh Chatter, 38, of Nexabit Networks.2  The development 
of the nouveaux riche in information technology is one of the 
most visible effects of an organizational pattern of research and 
development that has had profound consequences for both 
overseas investments in these activities and the incentives to 
improve intellectual property protection of software products 
around the world.  This Comment argues that this 
organizational pattern contributes to the concentration of 
software research and development in the U.S. and that 
improved overseas enforcement of copyright, trademark, and 
trade secret protection will not stimulate significant 
investment flows into these activities from U.S. software 
companies. 
Most writers who have examined the role of intellectual 
property protection in developing countries have argued that 
 
 *  Horacio Teran holds a law degree from the University of Monterrey, 
Mexico, a Ph.D. in Politics from NYU and a JSM from Stanford Law School.  
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 1. RANDALL E. STROSS, THE MICROSOFT WAY 44 (1996). 
 2. See, The IT Gold Rush: Made in India, Digitalised [sic] in US, 
COMPUTERS TODAY, Dec. 31, 1999, at 72. 
2 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
better protection generally has positive economic effects, 
whether measured in terms of increased foreign direct 
investment or rates of modernization and development.  The 
works of Rapp and Rozek,3 Robert Sherwood,4 Edwin 
Mansfield,5 and Belay Seyoum6 subscribe to this broad view.  
Each of these studies suffer from one or more of the following 
limitations: 
They fail to differentiate between the impact of intellectual 
property protection on different industry sectors.  The research 
that does differentiate on an industry basis assumes that the 
high-tech industries are more receptive to rewarding 
improvements in enforcement of intellectual property rights 
with investments then the more traditional industries.  This 
aspect is analyzed in greater detail in Section 2.4.  The 
research holds that even in a high-tech industry such as the 
software industry, improvements in enforcement of copyright, 
trade secret, and trademark rights will not have a significant 
impact on overseas investments in research and development.  
However, this Comment’s conclusions on the software industry 
are not necessarily applicable to other industries. 
They mistake a correlation in the data for a causal 
connection between intellectual property protection and foreign 
direct investment.  Countries that have a poor record of 
enforcement of software intellectual property rights, such as 
China and India, receive overseas investments.  In the absence 
of particular analyses of these countries, the current literature 
presents an overly deterministic view of the relationship 
between investment and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. 
They ignore other factors that affect investment decisions, 
such as software firm and market structures, intellectual 
property protection strategies of U.S. companies, information 
costs, and the business practices of local suppliers.  These 
aspects are not discussed in any of the above-mentioned 
 
 3. See generally Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs 
of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (1990). 
 4. See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment 
Stimulation: The Rating Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 
261, 359 (1997). 
 5. See generally Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct 
Investment, and Technology Transfer, 27 INT’L FIN. CORP. (1995). 
 6. See Belay Seyoum, The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on 
Foreign Direct Investment, 31 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 50, 51 (1996). 
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studies.  In contrast, this Comment will provide evidence in 
support of the view that these factors are direct determinants 
of the concentration of software research and development in 
the U.S.  This limitation of current research leads to an 
inaccurate depiction of the relationship between improved 
intellectual property protection and overseas investments in 
research and development—one in which investment rewards 
improvements in the overseas enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
A recent U.N. study is more cautious about the benefits of 
improved intellectual property protection,7 while other research 
concludes that the costs of intellectual property protection are 
higher than the benefits and that there is no positive economic 
outcome stemming from this type of protection.8 
This article examines the relationship between overseas 
investment in software research and development and the 
enforcement of copyright, trademark, and trade secret 
protection in the host country. The data collected shows that 
there is at best a very weak relationship between levels of 
enforcement of these intellectual property rights (as measured 
by software piracy rates and U.S. Trade Representative 
designations) and levels of foreign direct investment in 
software development for any particular country.  An 
overwhelming proportion of software research and development 
is carried out in the U.S.9  The small share of these activities 
that is conducted overseas occurs in the industrialized 
countries, through alliances between companies from the U.S. 
and Europe. 
Although there are alliances of U.S. software companies 
 
 7. See TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION, 
UNITED NATIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT (1993) (stating that prior studies and recent surveys do not 
provide solid evidence on the relationship between intellectual property rights 
and foreign direct investment). 
 8. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and 
Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L. J. 831 (1987).  
“[M]any of those studying the international patent system as it relates to 
developing countries have concluded that it is economically unsound for such 
countries to have a patent system if an overwhelming majority of patents are 
granted to foreigners.”  Id. at 832. 
 9. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS 1996 4-44 (1996) (stating that U.S. overseas research and 
development as a share of company-financed domestic research and 
development was about seven percent in 1993 for the non-manufacturing 
industries, including software development). 
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and suppliers from developing countries, for the most part 
these overseas suppliers perform software maintenance rather 
than design and development of new products.10  Even in the 
most successful cases, overseas efforts to develop new software 
products account for less than twenty-five percent of local 
supplier business.11  These trends are explained in greater 
detail in Section 3. 
The data reveal that existing overseas investment bears 
little relation to levels of intellectual property enforcement.  In 
fact, some of the leading recipients of software foreign direct 
investment have the worst levels of enforcement, despite 
changes in domestic formal rules that expand the scope of 
intellectual property protection.  China, India, Korea, and 
Taiwan are clear examples of this trend.  The recent experience 
of America Online (AOL) in Brazil provides an illustrative 
account of the situation that U.S. software companies face 
overseas.  When some people tried to load AOL’s new Brazilian 
Internet service last year, they were treated to the samba tune 
of dance band Raca Negra.12  Thanks to a factory mix-up, a 
batch of AOL’s start-up CD-ROMs contained the Brazilian 
group’s hit song “Lost Time” instead of software connecting 
them to the Web.13  But before AOL even got to the Web, a 
small-town Internet firm had nabbed the U.S. giant’s logical 
address, aol.com.br.14  Then free service providers mushroomed 
soon after AOL’s Brazilian president quit only weeks after the 
 
 10. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK & HAROLD W. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE 139 (1993) (stating that the 
Indian software subsidiaries that have been established to date have focused 
on software maintenance rather than on software design or development.  In 
November 1990, for example, Texas Instruments set up a new organization 
with facilities in Bangalore and in the U.S. known as IEF Software 
Reengineering Operations.  The IEF (information engineering facility) 
operation is an attempt  to address the vast need for software maintenance in 
the data processing centers of U.S. corporations. Various studies have found 
that the typical U.S. data processing environment spends anywhere from 60 to 
80 percent of its efforts on the maintenance of existing systems.  By combining 
low-cost Indian programmers with so-called CASE (computer aided software 
engineering) tools, Texas Instruments hopes to address this large and growing 
demand). 
 11. See N. Vittal,  India’s New Lever of Growth, COMPUTERS TODAY, July. 
15, 1999, at 16. 
 12. See Pamela Druckerman & Nick Wingfield, AOL’s Big Assault on 
Latin America Hits Snags in Brazil, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A1. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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company went online; he ended up with a competitor.15 
Public enforcement in developing countries can be 
improved if international and domestic intellectual property 
policies are aligned with the needs of local software suppliers.  
These actors share U.S. concerns over software piracy and have 
taken a stance to defend their rights.16 
Section I reviews the current literature on the economic 
impact of intellectual property protection.  While summarizing 
complex articles in a few pages does not do justice to the 
richness of the literature, this review is indispensable to assess 
the broader implications of this Comment. 
Section II develops a theory of the concentration of 
research and development activities in the U.S. on the basis of 
the collective learning needs of these companies, the dictates of 
the U.S. market and the intellectual property protection 
strategies of U.S. software companies.  Current literature on 
research and development organizational arrangements was 
used to explain the trends reflected in the National Science 
Board indicators.  This section also provides a brief history of 
intellectual property protection in the software industry and 
discusses attitudes towards the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and software piracy. 
Software piracy estimates collected by the Business 
Software Alliance and U.S. Trade Representative country 
reports were used to estimate the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in developing countries with a significant 
presence of software suppliers.  In the absence of systematic 
data on overseas U.S. investment in software research and 
development, this Comment relied on reports of country exports 
of software products to the U.S. to determine the presence of a 
significant software industry performing outsourcing functions 
for U.S. companies.  The science and engineering indicators 
published by the National Science Board were used to highlight 
(a) the level of concentration of software research and 
development in the U.S.; (b) the number of strategic research 
and development alliances; and (c) the nationality of the 
participants in the alliances.  The presentation of these overall 
 
 15. See id. 
 16. See  INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 23 (1999) (stating that a 
major Korean word processing software publisher, Hangul and Computer, was 
threatened with bankruptcy until a concerted nationwide effort was 
undertaken to end piracy of its products and to legalize pirated versions 
already installed). 
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trends was supplemented with examples from prominent 
corporations, such as Apple, IBM, and Microsoft.  Data on 
patent counts by class by year collected by the U.S. Patents and 
Trademarks Office was used to illustrate the greater reliance 
on intellectual property protection currently prevalent in the 
information industry. 
Two key arguments are presented in Section III.  First, 
organizational and market considerations act as inhibiting 
factors of overseas investment in software research and 
development.  At the firm level, companies concentrate their 
human capital involved in research and development to 
maximize collective learning and stimulate innovation.  At the 
market level, the overwhelming size of the U.S. market 
encourages software companies to locate their research and 
development activities in this country.  This facilitates effective 
and timely response to changes in market conditions. 
Second, enforcement of copyright, trade secret, and 
trademark protection is viewed by U.S. software companies as 
a means of protecting and recouping research and development 
costs, but considered only as one of a number of factors 
influencing overseas investment decisions.  This goes some way 
towards explaining why some countries with weak enforcement 
are leading recipients of foreign direct investment by U.S. 
software companies.  In the case of China and India, market 
potential presumably offsets the risk of loss from poor 
intellectual property enforcement.  An example is software 
giant Microsoft, which has research facilities in China and 
India to develop software products. 
Section III examines the implications of the weak 
relationship between enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and overseas research and development investments for 
current international efforts to strengthen software protection.  
Country reports from the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
literature that evaluates U.S. efforts in countries that have 
significant enforcement problems were used to provide an 
overall assessment of U.S. policies. 
What are the consequences of the poor relationship 
between intellectual property enforcement and overseas 
investments in software research and development?  This 
Comment addresses this question in the context of ongoing 
international efforts to improve enforcement of intellectual 
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property rights promoted by U.S. authorities17and the software 
industry.18  A fundamental contradiction lies at the core of 
international intellectual property policies: developing 
countries participate in these efforts to attract overseas 
investments, while the potential investors, the U.S. software 
companies, are more interested in protecting their investments 
in their home country.  U.S.T.R. policy supports company 
interests.19 
 
 17. See United States Trade Representative, “Special 301” on Intellectual 
Property Rights Fact Sheet (visited Jan.15, 2000) 
<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/factsheets.htm.> (stating that 
amended Section 301 of The Trade Act of 1974 requires the U.S.T.R. to 
investigate countries that have a history of violating laws and agreements 
dealing with intellectual property rights).  Countries whose observance of 
intellectual property rights are sub-par are placed on: (a) a priority watch list, 
which opens bilateral discussions, or (b) a watch list which means that U.S. 
authorities will monitor progress in implementing commitments with regard 
to the protection of intellectual property rights and providing comparable 
market access for U.S. intellectual property products.  See id.  The worst 
offenders, called priority foreign countries, can be subject to trade sanctions.  
See id.  The current priority watch countries with deficient software protection 
are Greece, India, Indonesia, and Korea.  See id.  The watch list is composed of 
26 countries of which the following have been singled out for software piracy: 
Brazil, Chile, Kuwait, Paraguay, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and Thailand.  See id.  China 
is the single priority foreign country.  See id. 
 18. In accordance with U.S. intellectual property policy, software 
companies sponsor joint efforts to stop piracy, most notably under the auspices 
of the Business Software Alliance (BSA).  Established in 1988, the BSA seeks 
to (a) educate computer users on software rights; (b) advocate public policy 
that fosters innovation and expands trade opportunities; and (c) fight software 
piracy.  See Business Software Alliance, About BSA (visited Dec. 3, 2000) 
<http://www.bsa.org/USA/about/>.  BSA worldwide members include industry 
giants Adobe Systems Incorporated, Attachmate Corporation, Lotus 
Development Corporation, Macromedia, Microsoft Corporation, Network 
Associates, Novell, Symantec Corporation, and Visio Corporation.  Additional 
members of BSA’s Policy Council include Apple Computer, Compaq Computer 
Corporation, IBM, Intel Corporation, Intuit, and Sybase.  See Business 
Software Alliance, About BSA (visited Dec. 3, 2000) 
<http://www.bsa.org/USA/about/members_list_c.phtml>.  The member 
companies account for over 70% of the U.S. prepackaged software market.  
The BSA sometimes conducts surprise raids on companies suspected of using 
pirated versions of computer software.  See Business Software Alliance, 
Atlanta Law Firm Settles Software Piracy Claims (visited Oct. 31, 2000) 
<http://www.bsa.org/USA/press/newsreleases//2000-10-31,356.phtml> (stating 
that in some cases the BSA will pursue software raids). 
 19. See BENEDICTE CALLAN, PIRATES ON THE HIGH SEAS 2-3 (1998).  The 
first objective of current U.S. policy is strengthening U.S. exports in the 
entertainment and technology industries.  See id.  The second objective is to 
combat the free rider problem inherent in industrial research and 
development investments.  See id.  A third objective is to expand the 
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The cornerstone of current international policies is 
improving public enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
developing countries.20  The weak relationship between the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and overseas 
investments jeopardizes developing country commitment to 
improved public enforcement.  The modest flow of investments 
suggests that enforcement might not be significantly improved 
and U.S. losses will not be substantially reduced, even if 
traditional obstacles to the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights are overcome.  The obstacles include: (1) differences in 
attitude21 and culture,22 particularly between Asian and 
European societies; (2) nationalist bias against U.S. companies 
in courts23 and legislatures;24 (3) administrative deficiencies;25 
 
innovation pie for all countries under the assumption that access to technology 
would spur growth in developing countries.  See id. 
 20. For the purposes of this paper, public enforcement is the commitment 
of national governments to: (1) allocate resources to police agencies that 
investigate piracy; (2) eradicate police corruption in the enforcement process; 
and (3) promote awareness in local courts on the importance of protecting 
foreign intellectual property. 
 21. See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT’L  & COMP. 
L.J. 1, 24 (1999) (stating that copyright in the West is a payoff to encourage 
individual authors to create, whereas in the East it is not uncommon for an 
artist to gain validity by mimicking previous works). 
 22. See  William J. Bien, Structural Impediments to Chinese Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights 5-6 (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the author).  This manuscript states that fears that the computer 
industry can contribute to cultural “contamination” are not a rarity among the 
Chinese leadership. See id. at 6.  These fears are coupled with a puritan sense 
of morality.  See id. 
 23. See Theodore G. Bryant, The History, Development and Changing 
Environment of Protecting Computer Software Against Copyright Violation in 
Brazil, 8 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 375, 377 n. 10 (1995) (highlighting that Microsoft 
won a $10 million award in a software piracy case in 1993.  The defendant was 
Prologica Microcomputers, a major Brazilian computer manufacturer accused 
of selling unauthorized versions of Microsoft’s Disk Operating System (DOS).  
Prologica installed the software directly onto the computers they 
manufactured, and claimed the application, which they labeled SO-16 was 
independently created.  An audit of Prologica’s records ordered by the court, 
revealed that the company had spent no money on research and development.  
However, Microsoft’s victory was only the second such judicial decision in 
favor of a foreign manufacturer of software against a local Brazilian violator). 
 24. See Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
63, 86 (1999) (stating that the 1999 copyright law of China establishes that 
national interest limits the scope of software copyright).  Article 31 of the 1990 
Copyright Law provides that the similarity between newly developed and 
existing software will not constitute copyright infringement if the similarity is 
necessary for the execution of national policies, laws, regulations, or rules, or 
for the implementation of national technical standards.  See id. at 87.  In such 
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and (4) corruption.26 
Section IV presents guidelines to develop international and 
domestic policies that can strengthen local software suppliers 
so that they can become effective promoters of improved 
intellectual property rights enforcement.  The arguments in 
favor of a policy alignment along these lines are outlined below.  
First, government officials in developing countries need to 
understand why improving enforcement of software intellectual 
property rights is in the national interest.  Software is 
protected by copyright, trademark, and trade secret domestic 
laws in the countries that are discussed in this study.  
However, government officials may have an inducement to lax 
enforcement, at least for educational or small business use.  
Promoting the development of a local software industry is a 
plausible goal that can motivate these authorities to engage in 
sustained efforts to improve intellectual property protection.  
Governments from developing countries might be more 
receptive to international efforts to improve intellectual 
property protection if these efforts are congruent with domestic 
policies to strengthen local software industries and establish 
competitive supplier markets.27  Furthermore, the prestige and 
performance record of local suppliers may influence investment 
decisions.  A company representative interviewed for this 
project stated that “we will be more likely to invest in a country 
if we can find out who are the local suppliers we can trust.”  
This is particularly plausible in cases of overseas investments 
to develop products for the U.S. market, where delays or 
deficiencies of overseas subcontractors can affect the 
responsiveness of U.S. companies to changes in the U.S. 
market. 
Second, local suppliers can play a role in overcoming 
nationalist and administrative barriers to improvements in 
public enforcement of intellectual property rights.  With 
adequate organizational and financial resources, they can put 
 
instances, no compensation is provided to the copyright holder.  See id. 
 25. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 381 (discussing the Brazilian attitude 
that intellectual property violations are a cost of doing business). 
 26. See Bien, supra note 22, at 7 (stating that in China, public security 
agencies seem to value their investment in counterfeiting factories more than 
they value the law). 
 27. But see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
225 (1999) (arguing that intellectual property protection can limit competition 
by creating incentives to hide code rather than to make its functionality 
obvious). 
10 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
pressure on local authorities to commit to public enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  Improvements in enforcement 
encouraged by local software suppliers will benefit U.S. 
research and development activities. 
Policy changes can strengthen the position of local software 
suppliers.  At the international level, the U.S. software 
industry should support the efforts of software suppliers to 
improve their organization for collective action as well as 
provide them financial assistance to defend their intellectual 
property rights in courts.28  At the domestic level, in addition to 
improvements in intellectual property protection,29 
development policies should address the requirements of the 
software industry, particularly human capital and financial 
support. 
 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
 
Four analytical categories were selected to compare the 
research.  The first category focuses on the type of relationship 
established in each work.  This relationship is formed by 
intellectual property rights or a sub-set of these rights, such as 
patent rights, the protection of which may or may not have a 
particular economic impact, such as modernization, 
development, foreign direct investment or technology transfer.  
The second category focuses on the question of whether 
intervening economic policies and political factors are perceived 
 
 28. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES. 
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 (1994) 
(stating that the formalities and complexities of participation in the 
adjudicative process require a significant accumulation of knowledge and 
experience.  By contrast, consumers and voters often face a far less expensive 
road to registering their needs in the market or the political process). 
 29. See Lionel L. Lavenue, Database Rights and Technical Data Rights: 
The Expansion of Intellectual Property for the Protection of Databases, SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1, 21 (1997) (stating that although most states consider the 
misappropriation of trade secrets a civil matter, more and more states are 
beginning also to recognize criminal sanctions for the improper appropriation 
of trade secrets.  These sanctions are particularly relevant to computer 
companies because trade secrecy provides a particularly advantageous means 
of protection because software may be licensed and distributed without 
disclosure of the actual code). 
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by the researchers to play a role in limiting the economic 
impact of intellectual property rights.  The third category 
compares the existing research on the basis of whether the 
economic impact of intellectual property rights is assessed in 
particular industries or in the economy as a whole.  Finally, the 
fourth category presents some of the key conclusions of the 
reviewed literature that are of major relevance to this study. 
Sections 2.2 through 2.5 discuss each of these categories in 
greater detail. 
The following table is the reference point to analyze the 
recent research on the economic impact of intellectual property 
protection: 
 
Table 1 
 
Key Features of the Conventional Conceptualizations on the 
Economic Impact of Intellectual Property Protection 
 
 Type of 
relationship 
Mediating 
factors 
Analyzed 
industries 
Conclusions 
Rapp and 
Rozek 
Intellectual 
property 
rights/ 
Moderni-
zation 
None 
 
 
Pharmaceut-
ical industry 
 
Causal 
linkage 
between 
intellectual 
property 
protection 
and moderni-
zation. 
Robert 
Sherwood 
Intellectual 
property 
rights/ 
Foreign 
direct 
investment 
None 
 
 
Undifferenti-
ated 
 
Correlation 
between 
intellectual 
property 
protection 
and foreign 
direct 
investment. 
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Edwin 
Mansfield 
Intellectual 
property 
rights/ 
foreign direct 
investment 
and 
technology 
transfer 
Size of 
market, 
degree of 
industrial- 
ization, 
openness of 
economy 
 
 
Chemicals, 
pharmaceut-
icals, 
machinery 
and electrical 
equipment 
Causal 
relationship 
between 
intellectual 
property 
protection 
and foreign 
direct 
investment. 
Belay 
Seyoum 
Intellectual 
property 
rights/ 
Foreign 
direct 
investment 
Market size 
(change in 
GDP), public 
investment 
as a ratio of 
GDP, 
external debt 
to exports 
and exchange 
rates 
 
Undifferenti-
ated 
 
Correlation 
between 
intellectual 
property 
protection 
and foreign 
direct 
investment. 
United 
Nations 
Trans-
national 
Corpora-
tions and 
Manage-
ment 
Division 
Intellectual 
property 
rights/foreign 
direct 
investment 
 
 
Rapid 
economic 
growth, low 
costs, relative 
stability, 
growing labor 
skill and 
technological 
capabilities 
Pharmaceut-
icals, 
software, 
chemicals, 
electrical 
engineering 
Inconclusive 
evidence of a 
relation 
between 
intellectual 
property 
protection 
and foreign 
direct 
investment. 
Samuel 
Oddi 
 
Participation 
in 
international 
patent 
system/ 
development 
Political 
stability, 
materials and 
labor force 
available at 
competitive 
costs, 
international 
and local 
market 
Undifferenti-
ated 
 
No relation 
between 
patent 
protection 
and 
development. 
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B. TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP 
 
Rapp and Rozek investigated the benefits and costs of 
strong intellectual property protection in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Their research sought to establish a relationship 
between intellectual property protection and modernization.  
Modernization was operationalized in eight variables: (1) per 
capita gross domestic product; (2) percentage of households 
with electricity; (3) percentage of households with water; (4) 
presence of a social security system; (5) infant mortality; (6) 
percentage of the workforce in agriculture; (7) proportion of 
physicians to total population; and (8) whether the country is a 
former British colony.30 
The impact of patent protection on the above stated 
variables is in all likelihood diffuse.  Establishing a correlation 
between intellectual property protection and some of the 
variables (presence of a social security system, proportion of 
total physicians to total population) might not be a fruitful 
exercise because any correlation is highly unlikely.  Rapp and 
Rozek could have chosen variables of modernization that reflect 
the growing level of industrialization of a country, such the 
share of GDP that corresponds to high-tech goods, or the 
proportion of the workforce in the technology sector.  If they 
had chosen this path, they would have been in a better position 
to establish a correlation between modernization and 
intellectual property protection. 
Samuel Oddi sought to address the validity of the 
assumption that there is a causal relationship between a 
developing country’s participation in the international patent 
system and its economic development.  He analyzed whether 
the traditional cost benefit analysis for patent systems in 
developed countries applies to developing countries, and then 
focused on the legal and economic consequences of participation 
by developing countries in the legal regime of the international 
patent system as primarily embodied in the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883.31  
Development is too broad a category to use in determining the 
impact of the patent system. 
Furthermore, it appears that “development” has different 
meanings throughout Oddi’s work.  It can refer to the 
 
 30. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 3, at 8. 
 31. See Oddi, supra note 8, at 836. 
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availability of inventions in a country,32 to technology transfer,33 
or to foreign direct investment.34  Arguably, not all of these 
criteria are evidence of development.  That a country can allow 
the importation of software is not necessarily an indication of 
development.  It merely reflects the absence of trade 
restrictions.  Additionally, not all foreign direct investment 
provides a significant boost to development.  If a U.S. software 
company sells its products in developing countries, it may be 
contributing to local employment much more than to the 
development of the country.  Only technology transfer is 
directly related to development. 
Robert Sherwood and Belay Seyoum analyzed the 
relationship between the protection of intellectual property 
rights and foreign direct investment.  This approach is bound to 
lead to more fruitful conclusions than Rapp and Rozek’s work 
because it is easier to assess the impact of intellectual property 
protection on a narrower economic dimension, such as foreign 
direct investment, than on the broader notion of modernization.  
The same argument applies to Oddi’s use of development as a 
reference point, because development is too broad to lend itself 
to conclusions that can be directly traced to the patent system.  
However, the Sherwood and Seyoum research can be refined by 
distinguishing the different types of investment that can be 
stimulated through the protection of intellectual property 
rights. 
Edwin Mansfield takes up the task of assessing the impact 
of intellectual property rights on different types of investment.  
His research sought to establish a relationship between 
intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment and 
technology transfer.  The U.N. study directly refers to 
Mansfield’s research, acknowledging the empirical relevance of 
assessing intellectual property protection in the context of 
different types of investment.35 
This article avoids establishing a relationship between 
intellectual property protection and the broad notions of 
modernization and development.  Influenced by Mansfield, the 
research that was conducted to develop this Comment 
discriminated between different types of investment.  However, 
this Comment challenges a key assumption of the Mansfield 
 
 32. See id. at 848. 
 33. See id. at 852. 
 34. See id. at 849. 
 35. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 5. 
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analysis.  Mansfield’s assumption is that investments in 
research and development are more sensitive to improvements 
in intellectual property protection than other types of 
investments such as distribution and sales.  The Microsoft 
experience in China illustrates this point.  Nancy Anderson, 
Associate Counsel at Microsoft, communicated to the author 
that the company did not have a choice in deciding whether to 
market their products in China.  “Our products were already in 
China, and they were being supplied by software pirates.”  It 
was therefore in the company’s interest to invest in distribution 
and sales.  This is within the Mansfield argument.  However, 
Microsoft decided to establish a software development facility 
in China, despite the fact that nine out of ten software copies 
sold in China are pirated.  The mediating factors that explain 
Microsoft’s decision are discussed in the next section. 
 
C. MEDIATING FACTORS 
 
Concerning the question of mediating factors in the 
relationship between protection of intellectual property rights 
and a desired economic outcome (modernization, development, 
foreign direct investment, or technology transfer, in accordance 
with each particular body of research), the works of Rapp and 
Rozek and Sherwood do not take into account that intervening 
policies not related to the question of enforcement of these 
rights can have an impact on technology transfer.  Oddi argues 
that many factors beyond the availability of a patent system 
enter into a decision about whether to invest in a particular 
developing country.36  However, there are no clear guidelines in 
the Oddi research as to how to weigh these factors. 
Mansfield and Seyoum assessed the particular influence of 
the mediating factors in the relationship between intellectual 
property rights and economic outcomes.  Mansfield took into 
account the impact of the size of market, the degree of 
industrialization, and the openness of the economy, and how 
they relate to intellectual property rights, foreign direct 
investment, and technology transfer.37 
 
 36. See Oddi, supra note 8, at 849 (arguing that among these factors are: 
(1) the political stability of a country; (2) the availability of materials and labor 
force at competitive costs; and (3) the international as well as the local 
market). 
 37. This analysis of the software industry suggests that the potential 
market of the host country can override concerns for intellectual property 
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Seyoum sought to determine the relationship between 
foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights 
protection taking into account the role played by the following 
economic variables: (1) levels of economic growth as measured 
by changes in GDP; (2) the rate of public sector investment; (3) 
the size of external debt relative to GDP; and (4) 
macroeconomic stability as measured by the exchange rate.  He 
assumed that higher levels of intellectual property protection 
increase foreign direct activity, as do higher levels of economic 
growth, public sector investment, external borrowing, and low 
exchange rates. 
Why is it important to analyze the economic policies of the 
host country when assessing the impact of intellectual property 
protection on investment and technology transfer?  A recent 
study by Charles-Albert Michalet contends that the investment 
strategies of multinational corporations take into account the 
following features of host countries: (1) presence of a stable and 
facilitating political and economic base and a transparent and 
non-discretionary legal and regulatory framework; (2) an 
attractive market characterized by a strong and sustained rate 
of growth, an equitable distribution of domestic income, 
expansion and integration of the regional market; and (3) the 
existence of adequate human capital and technical capabilities.  
Even though Michalet does not expressly address intellectual 
property rights, they are a contributing factor to the stable 
political and legal framework.  Yet this broad legal and political 
base on its own cannot ensure foreign direct investment; it is 
merely a contributing factor in the investment decisions of 
multinational corporations.38 
The U.N. study is even more cautious than Michalet 
concerning the impact of these types of legal factors in 
promoting foreign direct investment.  The study holds that (1) 
 
protection.  The experience of Microsoft in China illustrates this argument.  
The company is willing to invest in research and development in this country 
despite deficient intellectual property protection because the market size is 
attractive. 
 38. See Charles-Albert Michalet, Investment Strategies of Multinational 
Corporations and the Attractiveness of Host Countries, 10 THE WORLD BANK 2-
3 (1997) (arguing that firms’ perceptions and choices among the developing 
and transition countries are focused on a number of restricted “core countries.”  
These countries have comparable political, legal and economic features.  
Without them, a country is excluded from the core.  This gets a country in the 
investor’s “short list” of priority locations.  Therefore, an investment promotion 
policy’s chances of success will depend on its ability to move a country out of 
the circle of “potential” candidates and into the circle of “core countries”). 
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rapid economic growth; (2) low costs; (3) relative stability; (4) 
growing labor skills; and (5) technological capabilities have 
opened significant opportunities in countries that have 
inadequate intellectual property protection offsetting these 
deficiencies.  On the other hand, where the economic 
environment is unfavorable or lacking in industrial or 
technological infrastructure, adopting high intellectual 
property standards will not have a significant effect on 
intellectual property protection.39 
None of the studies analyzed two mediating factors that 
play a pivotal role in overseas research and development 
investments: (1) organizational arrangements and strategies of 
companies, and (2) information costs incurred by U.S. 
companies seeking overseas suppliers.  This Comment provides 
evidence in support of the view that the organizational 
integration of the software companies hinders offshore 
investments in software development.  In addition, the task of 
distinguishing the skills offered by the many different offshore 
suppliers40 is not cost-effective for U.S. companies.  This cost is 
a greater obstacle to software development alliances than the 
shortcomings of intellectual property protection in the 
developing countries.  In an interview conducted in support of 
this Comment, a representative of a U.S. high-tech corporation 
stated that umbrella associations with the records of local 
suppliers are a valuable asset for countries seeking to attract 
contracts from U.S. software companies to develop products. 
 
D. OVERALL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VERSUS U.S. INDUSTRY — 
 SPECIFIC STUDIES 
 
A key distinction among the studies is whether particular 
industries are taken into account to assess the relationship 
between intellectual property protection and economic 
processes, or whether the assessment of the relationship is 
based on an overview of the economy of each country.  
Sherwood and Seyoum are supporters of the broad and 
undifferentiated positive impact of intellectual property 
 
 39. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 4. 
 40. See INTERNATIONAL DATA CORPORATION, THE GRAY SHEET COMPUTER 
INDUSTRY REPORT 7 (1993) (stating that the decision to invest in offshore 
software development is based on the following features of the subcontractor: 
positive and negative corporate characteristics, methodologies, management 
philosophies, ethical standards, facilities and financial stability). 
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protection.  Oddi provides the counterargument that patent 
protection does not correlate with development.  Both lines of 
argument draw broad conclusions, although at opposite ends of 
the spectrum. 
The U.N. study cautions against this broad approach 
shared by Seyoum, Sherwood and Oddi because in all likelihood 
this type of analysis does not capture the consequences of 
changes in property rights.41  The U.N. study argues that 
intellectual property rights do not have the same importance 
and effects in every industry, given, among other factors, (1) 
the varying intensity in research and development; (2) the 
speed of technological change; (3) the relative significance of 
formalized and tacit knowledge; and (4) the type of 
producer/user relationship.  The U.N. study briefly discusses 
the varying importance of intellectual property rights in the 
pharmaceutical, software, chemicals, and electrical engineering 
industries.42  However, the study draws few conclusions. 
Mansfield concluded that in relatively high-technology 
industries such as chemical, pharmaceutical, machinery, and 
electrical equipment, the system of intellectual property 
protection of a country often has a significant effect on the 
amount and type of technology transfer and direct investment 
in that country by German, Japanese, and U.S. firms.  The 
percentage of firms that consider patent protection a high 
priority was higher in these sectors than in the transportation 
equipment, metals, or food industries.43  The evidence 
presented in this Comment suggests that Mansfield’s 
conclusion should be taken with caution.  Overseas investments 
in software development do not seem to be highly sensitive to 
the differences in enforcement of intellectual property rights 
offered by host countries.  The representatives of high-tech 
companies interviewed for this Comment stated that local 
human capital and economic incentives affected investment 
decisions more than the different levels of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in these countries.  Therefore, there 
is no clear relationship between the level of technology 
intensity in an industry, offshore research and development 
investment, and improvements in enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
Rapp and Rozek relied on an industry-specific analysis.  
 
 41. See id. at 25. 
 42. See id. at 6-7. 
 43. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 2. 
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However, their study focused narrowly on patent protection in 
the pharmaceutical industry.  This tends to limit the impact of 
their work, as it would be improper to draw broad conclusions 
about the influence of the intellectual property protection on 
modernization based exclusively on a single case study. 
 
E.  CONCLUSIONS OF THE EXISTING RESEARCH 
 
Rapp and Rozek concluded that nations with stronger 
patent systems enjoyed more rapid economic development for 
three reasons: (1) sophisticated patent rights foster economic 
growth by increasing the rate of innovation and investment in 
innovative activities; (2) underdeveloped property rights 
impede economic advancement, causing inadequate patent 
systems to be associated with economic backwardness; and (3) 
the process of economic development causes patents and other 
intellectual property rights to appreciate in value due to 
enhanced sales and profits from their use.44 
The Rapp and Rozek study clearly shows that for the 
majority of countries analyzed, there was a correlation between 
patent protection and modernization.  Furthermore, they 
support their views with data that indicates that 
pharmaceutical research and development is conducted in most 
countries where intellectual property is protected.45  Based on 
their research findings, Rapp and Rozek concluded that there 
was a causal relationship between the presence of efficient 
intellectual property rights and economic modernization.46  The 
modernization and patent protection data revealed that the 
relationship between them was valid, with the exception of 
“about” twenty countries, which, according to Rapp and Rozek, 
have good prospects for economic growth, but have failed to 
revise outdated patent laws and run the risk of discouraging 
technological change.47 
The fact that patent protection and modernization 
 
 44. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 3, at 14-22. 
 45. See id. at i (stating that about 70% of U.S. pharmaceutical research 
and development abroad is in Western Europe, and the share in other 
countries with strong protection, such as Japan and Australia, is growing.  By 
contrast, in  Latin America and Africa, where most countries have been 
reluctant to improve intellectual property protection, the proportion of 
research and development spending by U.S. firms has decreased significantly 
to less than three percent of the total). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
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correlate does not mean that there is a causal relationship.  It 
might well be the case that as countries “modernize,” economic 
groups with an interest in strengthening the patent system 
gain political influence.  Thus, the actual relationship might be 
the reverse of the one suggested by Rapp and Rozek. 
Sherwood holds that there is a correlation between 
intellectual property protection and foreign direct investment.  
He supports his conclusion with a comparison of his findings 
with the research conducted by Mansfield, Seyoum, and Rapp 
and Rozek.  However, Sherwood could have sought to prove or 
disclaim the relationship in his interview process.  He could 
have asked the participants what factors lead to changes in 
intellectual property protection.  Do changes in the formal rules 
empower groups that have an interest in enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, or rather, do the groups pushing 
for changes in the formal rules encourage higher levels of 
enforcement?  In all likelihood, the process is a “two way street” 
in which organizations interact with institutions, influencing 
each other.48 
According to Mansfield, the variations in the amount of 
U.S. foreign direct investment can be explained by the size of 
the market, the stock of prior foreign direct investment in the 
country, and a measure of the weakness of intellectual property 
protection in the country.49  However, with the exception of 
intellectual property protection, it is not clear how the other 
factors are assessed in his research.  Given that Mansfield 
confined his interviews to people knowledgeable on patent 
issues, it would seem likely that the other factors affecting 
foreign direct investment and technology transfer would not be 
fully accounted for by his interviewees.  This highlights a 
problem faced by current research on the impact of intellectual 
property protection: how to isolate the effects of intellectual 
property protection and distinguish them from the influence of 
other factors.50 
Seyoum concluded that intellectual property rights have a 
positive impact on investment, as do market size and public 
 
 48. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7 (1990) (arguing that institutions determine the 
opportunities in a society and organizations are created to take advantage of 
those opportunities and as the organizations evolve they alter the 
institutions). 
 49. See Mansfield, supra note 5, at 23. 
 50. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 1. 
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investment rates.51  Foreign direct investment in the developed 
countries tends to be in research-intensive sectors that are less 
influenced by the availability of resources or market size.  This 
means that such firms are less likely to transfer advanced 
technology to countries with weak protection for certain 
intellectual property rights, such as copyrights or trademarks.52 
The U.N. study concluded that there is an “uncertain 
relationship” between intellectual property protection and the 
volume and composition of foreign direct investment.  Much 
innovative activity in developing countries is imitative, 
associated with smaller innovations with a significant informal 
component.  The importance of trade secrets and petty patents 
in stimulating incremental innovative activity suggests that 
there is considerable scope for measures, other than legislative 
changes on intellectual property rights, to enhance 
performance in this area.53 
Oddi argues that there is no evidence to support the claim 
that a patent incentive should be provided to induce the 
creation of needed innovations.  He states that the 
overwhelming majority of patents granted by developing 
countries are assigned to foreigners, while a significant number 
of patents granted in any given developed country are granted 
to its nationals.54  By protecting inventions, particularly foreign 
inventions that are not patent induced, developing countries 
significantly add to the cost side of the cost/benefit analysis 
applied in Oddi’s work.  Regarding foreign direct investment, 
Oddi claims that the absence of patent protection may 
sometimes be a factor leading to foreign investment.  For 
example, foreign investment in the manufacture of generic 
drugs could be induced in those developing countries that do 
not protect pharmaceuticals.55 
The clear weight of the evidence suggests that improved 
enforcement of intellectual property rights does not 
significantly contribute to offshore investment in software 
development.  If software producers relied on the quality of 
enforcement of intellectual property rights to determine 
offshore investment, there would be a strong positive relation 
between investments and improvements in enforcement.  For 
 
 51. See Seyoum, supra note 6, at 55. 
 52. See id. at 58. 
 53. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 25. 
 54. See Oddi, supra note  8, at 853. 
 55. See id. at 849. 
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the purpose of this argument, a list of countries reported to 
have U.S. offshore investments in software development was 
compiled.  These countries are the major exporters of software 
products to the U.S.  The quality of intellectual property rights 
enforcement was assessed on the basis of their software piracy 
rates56 and the U.S. Trade Representative country reports on 
the state of intellectual property protection.  While the U.S.T.R. 
country reports are not exempt from the critique that political 
motivations come to play in their conclusions, they can provide 
a basic reference point to determine the level of enforcement of 
U.S. intellectual property rights.  The BSA studies serve the 
same purpose, provided that their cost/benefit analyses are 
used to convey a broad perspective on the illegal use of 
software.  The following table presents the results of this 
exercise: 
 
Table 2 
 
Selected Data on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Several Countries 
 
Country Software Exports to 
U.S. 
(millions of U.S. 
dollars) 
 1990       1992       1994 
Rate of Software 
Piracy 
 
  
1994  1995   1996   1997 
U.S.T.R. 
Status 
Canada 55.9 108.5 117.1 46% 44% 42% 39% Watch list 
Singapore 9.7 17.9 69.8 61% 53% 59% 56% Watch list 
U.K. 12.7 26.4 30.9 42% 38% 34% 31% - 
Japan 22.2 28.7 26.0 66% 55% 41% 32% Priority watch 
list 
France 7.4 6.7 13.5 53% 51% 45% 44% - 
Taiwan 5.9 13.6 13.2 72% 70% 66% 63% - 
Argentina 0.2 0.1 7.5 80% 80% 71% 65% Priority watch 
list 
 
 56. See Business Software Alliance, 1999 Global Software Piracy Report 
(visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.bsa.org/USA/globallib/piracy/piracy 
stats99.phtml>. 
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China 0.2 4.8 6.2 97% 96% 96% 96% Priority foreign country 
India 0.7 0.7 4.857 79% 78% 79% 69% Priority watch list 
Italy 1.0 1.2 2.9 69% 61% 55% 43% Watch list 
Hong Kong 1.5 9.1 2.5 62% 62% 64% 67% - 
Korea 2.2 2.0 1.1 75% 76% 70% 67% Priority watch list 
 
This table reveals that countries with the largest volumes 
of software exports to the U.S. have different rates of software 
piracy and different standing with the U.S.T.R.  Canada and 
Singapore are the top software exporters; however, Singapore’s 
piracy rate is significantly higher than the corresponding 
Canadian rate.  Among the five major software exporters, one 
is in good standing with the U.S.T.R., two are on the watch list, 
and one is on the priority watch list.  This supports the view 
that there is no direct relationship between software research 
and development investments and the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  Maskus reaches the same 
conclusion in a broader study of the relationship between 
foreign direct investment flows and intellectual property 
protection.58 
 
II. THE CONCENTRATION OF SOFTWARE RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. THE BROAD PATTERNS 
 
This section will provide evidence in support of this 
Comment’s view that the concentration of research and 
development activities is widespread among U.S. software 
companies.  Before doing so, the current alternatives to 
software research and development concentration will be 
highlighted.  This provides the necessary background so that 
 
57
 See Vittal, supra note 11, at 16 (placing the total value of Indian software exports at 
$2.6 billion in 1998). 
 58. See Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 128-29 (1998) (arguing that strong intellectual property 
rights alone do not sufficiently generate strong incentives for firms to invest in 
a country.  If that were the case, then recent foreign direct investment flows 
would have largely gone to Eastern Europe and other emerging regions with 
stronger intellectual property rights.  In contrast, Brazil, China, and other 
high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak intellectual 
property rights would have attracted less direct foreign investment). 
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we can build on the research that preceded this Comment. 
A review of the literature reveals that the U.S. software 
industry follows three types of research and development 
strategies: (1) concentration of these activities in the U.S.; (2) 
strategic alliances with companies from other industrialized 
countries; and (3) investments in offshore software 
development.  Leading U.S. companies place their research and 
development facilities in their home country.59  Other research 
suggests that this trend is not limited to the software 
industry.60  The second strategy is becoming more common in 
the industry.  Information technology alliances doubled 
between 1980 and 1994, reaching almost five hundred.  The 
largest number of these relationships has been between U.S. 
and European firms, although the number of intra-European 
alliances is also substantial.61 
The software producers that follow the third strategy have 
sought to exploit the lower costs of foreign programmers by 
moving software development activities overseas.62  However, 
 
 59. See STROSS, supra note 1, at 130-31 (stating that in 1991, Microsoft 
decided to end the practice of researchers being dispersed in the company, 
choosing to group them together. Other examples of this trend are: (a) the Palo 
Alto Research Center of Xerox; (b) IBM’s Watson Research Center; and (c) 
Apple’s Advanced Technology Group). 
 60. See Parimal Patel & Keith Pavitt, Uneven (and divergent) 
Technological Accumulation Among Advanced Countries: Evidence and a 
Framework of Explanation, TECHNOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND 
COMPETITIVENESS. PERSPECTIVES ON INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE 
303-04 (1998) (arguing that firms making products with the highest 
technology intensities, such as aircraft, instruments, motor vehicles, 
computers and other electrical products are among those with the lowest 
degrees of internationalization of their underlying technological activities.  In 
all of these products, links between research and development and design, on 
the one hand, and production on the other, are particularly important in the 
launching of major new products and benefit from geographical proximity). 
 61. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 4-44. 
 62. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 65-67 (stating that 
Ashton-Tate, Claris, Lotus, Microsoft and other developers are in different 
stages of transferring some of their research and development activities to 
Ireland.  Attracted in part by lower programmer wages, U.S. companies have 
also formed joint ventures in several Asian nations to develop software.  IBM, 
for example, formed a joint venture with Taiwan’s government-supported 
Institute for Information Industry to form a company, called International 
Integrated Systems Inc., to develop software for IBM.  In 1986, Texas 
Instruments established a wholly owned subsidiary in Bangalore to develop 
and maintain its proprietary CAD software.  Hewlett-Packard also runs an 
offshore subsidiary, the India Software Organization (ISO) in Bombay.  In 
addition, Ashton-Tate plans to relocate university-trained programmers to the 
U.S. from India, where the average annual cost of programmers (salary and 
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captive development organizations in foreign countries require 
an up-front investment in sophisticated data 
telecommunications links, most likely by satellite.63  This 
incremental capital requirement reduces the foreign country’s 
labor cost advantage over U.S.-based programmers.  
Nevertheless, as international telecommunications costs fall, 
captive development functions of this type should become 
increasingly cost effective in the future. 
Research and development undertaken abroad is not 
meant to displace domestic efforts.  Rather, offshore research 
and development tends to follow overseas production activities 
and is intended to support firms’ foreign business growth.  
"Such research is typically directed towards supporting 
production facilities, customizing products to local market 
demands, and tracking and capitalizing on foreign 
technological advancements."64 
The software industry fits the broader pattern of 
concentration of research and development activities in the 
industrialized countries depicted in the following table:65 
 
Table 3 
 
Geographic Location of Large Firms’ Global Patenting 
Activities, According to Nationality 
(1985-1990) 
 
 Percentage Shares 
 
 Home Abroad Of Which: 
   U.S. Europe Japan Other 
Japan (13) 98.9 1.1 0.8 0.3 - 0.0 
U.S. (249) 92.2 7.8 - 6.0 0.5 1.3 
Italy (7) 88.1 11.9 5.4 6.2 0.0 0.3 
France (26) 86.6 13.4 5.1 7.5 0.3 0.5 
Germany (43) 84.7 15.3 10.3 3.8 0.4 0.7 
 
overhead) is $10-12,000 per year). 
 63. See id. at 139 (stating that Texas Instruments’ Bangalore subsidiary 
communicates with the company’s advanced information management division 
in Plano Texas, via satellite). 
 64. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 4-44. 
 65. See Patel & Pavit, supra note 60, at 302. 
26 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
Finland (7) 81.7 18.3 1.9 11.4 0.0 4.9 
Norway (3) 68.1 31.9 12.6 19.3 0.0 0.0 
Canada (17) 66.8 33.2 25.2 7.3 0.3 0.5 
Sweden (13) 60.7 39.3 12.5 25.8 0.2 0.8 
U.K. (56) 54.9 45.1 35.4 6.7 0.2 2.7 
Switzerland (10) 53.0 47.0 19.7 26.1 0.6 0.5 
Netherlands (9) 42.1 57.9 26.2 30.5 0.5 0.6 
Belgium (4) 36.4 63.6 23.8 39.3 0.0 0.6 
All firms (587) 89.0 11.0 4.1 5.6 0.3 0.9 
 
The parenthetical numbers correspond to the number of 
firms in each of the countries.  This table reveals that U.S. and 
Japanese firms carry out an overwhelming proportion of 
research and development within their national borders.  These 
countries are extreme examples of the pattern of high 
concentration of research and development in the 
industrialized countries.  Additionally, only a small fraction of 
the overseas research and development activities take place in 
developing countries. 
 
B. EXPLAINING THE TREND: COLLECTIVE LEARNING AND THE 
MARKET 
 
Software producers concentrate their research and 
development activities in the U.S. because they assume that it 
is the most effective way to use their human capital and that it 
will enhance responsiveness to U.S. clients, which is a high 
priority in the industry. 
The software industry is heavily dependent on human 
capital to produce the innovations that will allow firms to 
develop in a highly competitive market.66  Perhaps the most 
critical factors of production, the programmers, are mobile from 
firm to firm and even from country to country, producing a high 
turnover rate in the software industry. 67  Firms in the U.S. and 
elsewhere can effectively reach many software technology 
frontiers by hiring skilled and experienced programmers in a 
competitive world market.68  This phenomenon also takes place 
 
 66. See OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF 
APPLE COMPUTER INC. 38 (1999). 
 67. See id. (revealing that out of 48 prominent members of Apple’s initial 
development, only three remained in 1998). 
 68. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 149. 
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in developing countries.69  Section 5 looks at the challenges that 
developing countries face due to the U.S. demand for 
programmers. 
Software companies provide generous financial benefits to 
their employees and engage in aggressive recruiting to secure 
human capital.70  “In addition to scouring college campuses for 
young prospects, Microsoft remains vigilant for opportunities to 
recruit the best-experienced hands from rival companies.”71  
“‘Direct sourcing’ is what Mike Murray, Microsoft’s vice-
president for human resources, called the recruiting campaign 
that would fasten on a software company that was doing 
technically interesting work.”72  “Microsoft acquired small 
software companies, not primarily for their customers or for 
their code, but for their in-house programming assets.”73  
“When the best programmers in such companies were the main 
shareholders, it was often easiest to simply buy the company 
outright, in effect, providing the talent with the equivalent of a 
signing bonus.”74 
To maximize the potential of human resources, software 
companies are organizationally integrated.75  At the heart of the 
 
 69. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 382 (stating that the constant theme in 
his interviews with Brazilian business leaders, government policy makers, 
attorneys, and scientific researchers was that most companies lost their 
proprietary technology through key technical employees hired away by 
competing firms offering higher employee salaries.  The “gypsy career” is 
viewed as a cost of doing business in Brazil.  The situation occurs when 
technical employees aspire to learn the technology of a company so as to 
position themselves to be hired away by competitors at attractive salaries.  
This practice increases salaries as companies seek to both attract and retain 
skilled employees). 
 70. See STROSS, supra note 1, at 24 (stating that the most important 
employee benefit was perhaps the one that made Microsoft a financially 
comfortable place to work: ownership of Microsoft stock among employees.  
The company promoted employee stock purchases with a 15% discount and 
offered stock options to some extent to all salaried employees who worked at 
the company for one year). 
 71. Id. at 42. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See WILLIAM LAZONICK, ORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 249 (1992) (defining organizational integration as a 
set of ongoing relationships that socializes participants in a complex division 
of labor to apply their skills and efforts to achieve common goals.  The 
foundation of the socialization process that achieves organizational integration 
is “membership”: the inclusion of the individual or group into the organization 
with all the rights and responsibilities that membership entails). 
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software company is the core design and development group, 
responsible for designing and controlling the architectural 
standard.76  “The group is kept as small as possible.  A 
radiating series of development groups surround the core 
group.”77 
What do software companies seek to achieve through 
organizational integration?  Companies in the information 
industry are dependent on collective learning, which enables 
the planned coordination of specialized divisions of labor to 
develop complex technology and generate productivity.78  
Without collective learning, specialized individuals cannot 
enhance their skills through communication with each other.  
Management’s role is to ensure the concentration of continuous, 
cumulative and collective learning.79  Ultimately, 
organizational integration acts as a strong disincentive for 
technology transfer from the company’s central office to its 
branch in the host country because transfers can weaken 
collective learning.80  Socialization requires human interaction.  
Geographical dispersion acts as a barrier to the socialization 
patterns central to organizational integration. 
Besides organizational integration, market considerations 
also reinforce the concentration of research and development 
activities.  Because the U.S. software market is extremely 
competitive, success in the U.S. is more likely to translate into 
success abroad than vice versa.81  With a large installed base of 
both recent generation computers and a wide selection of up-to-
date computer software, U.S. software users are sophisticated 
and discriminating in their choice of products.82  One result of 
U.S. testing of new products is that purchasers in other 
countries sometimes look to product success in the U.S. as a 
basis for licensing.83  Consequently, the direction of technology 
 
 76. See CHARLES H. FERGUSON & CHARLES R. MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS. 
HOW THE WEST CAN WIN IN A POST-IBM WORLD 175 (1993). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See LAZONICK, supra note 75, at 255. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Patel & Pavitt, supra note 60, at 303 (arguing that the rapid 
product development times in Japanese firms have been achieved from an 
almost exclusively Japanese base, while the strongly globalized research and 
development activities of the Dutch Philips company have slowed down 
product development). 
 81. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 90. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
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diffusion for computer software is from the U.S. to the rest of 
the world.84 
The gravitational pull of the U.S. market makes it more 
difficult for computer software companies to move operations 
offshore.  Product development in software is very closely 
linked to customer requirements, and customer requirements 
for the largest market are most easily monitored in the U.S.  
Taking advantage of new technologies may also be easier in the 
U.S. than elsewhere.  In the competitive races to bring new 
products and services to the market, any cost savings from 
offshore operations must be weighed against delay in 
introducing new products.85 
Jose Dominguez, President of South Tech Systems is 
reluctant to outsource more than a fraction of the company’s 
programming.  “Even though I’m happy with the work they’re 
doing (Indian and Armenian programmers based in their 
respective countries) it’s hard to oversee a project over the 
Internet.  You don’t have full control.”86  He also pointed out 
that communication over the Web has increased the 
opportunities for misunderstandings, and the time difference 
between the U.S. and Asia makes it difficult to talk by 
telephone.87 
Shneyderman, of Game-Colony.com, has fewer reservations 
about these international arrangements.88  He had planned on 
staffing his company with local software developers mainly 
because “it’s easier to oversee employees working in the same 
office than in one 11 time zones away.”89  However, the few 
qualified candidates he found wanted $90,000 a year, a signing 
bonus and stock options, which was far more than he could 
afford.90  Shneyderman decided to outsource a substantial 
portion of his firm’s high-tech work overseas, turning to his 
homeland.  His five Russian programmers earn about $18,000 a 
year each.91 
 
 
 84. See id. at 91. 
 85. See id. at 94. 
 86. Marc Ballon, US High-Tech Jobs Going Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2000, at C4. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
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C. HOW SOFTWARE COMPANIES VIEW INTELLECTUAL 
 PROPERTY PROTECTION 
 
Before the 1980s, the large U.S. companies in the 
information industry had a casual view of intellectual property 
protection.92  Their lax patent policing was an outgrowth of the 
strong U.S. technology position in the 1950s and 1960s,93a 
period in which broad cross-licensing was an efficient way to 
avoid patent battles when the information industry was divided 
among a few major players such as AT&T, IBM, and RCA; each 
with strong research laboratories.94  In accordance with the 
prevailing attitudes, Apple allowed Microsoft access to its 
operating system technology, and Intel’s broad licensing to 
companies like Texas Instruments opened the door to 
widespread cloning of its most advanced chips.  The view that 
software should be given away was not uncommon in the 
industry.95 
Since the 1980s, the attitudes towards intellectual property 
protection in the information industry have shifted from 
relative casualness to greater awareness that intellectual 
property protection and licensing practices are key elements of 
a company’s technological strategy.96  Currently, companies 
believe that licenses must be managed with a careful eye on the 
future, and whenever possible, be both specific and modular, in 
contrast to the broad cross-licenses of the past.97  The growing 
importance of intellectual property protection is reflected in the 
dramatic increase in patents in the information industry.98 
Intellectual property protection became more relevant with 
 
 92. See FERGUSON & MORRIS, supra note 76, at 155. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See LINZMAYER, supra note 66, at 49 (stating that even today Bill 
Gates is remembered as the 1970s outspoken advocate for commercializing the 
distribution of software in order to encourage software developers to continue 
to invest their labor.  Gates had heated exchanges with Jim Warren of the 
People’s Computer Company among others, who Gates charged with ripping 
off software without payment). 
 96. See FERGUSON & MORRIS, supra note 76, at 157. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office, Patent Counts by Class by 
Year 1/1977-12/31/1998 (visited Feb 10, 2000) <http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr98.htm> (showing that the total number of 
patents in computer graphics, information processing systems, data processing 
and computers, and digital processing systems was 1,266 in 1979, 8,748 in 
1989, and 31,212 in 1998). 
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the multiplication of software producers. 99  The rise of new 
competitors upset the reasoning of dominant companies in the 
information industry, because the direction of licensing was 
unilateral and in some instances the emerging software 
companies simply “grabbed” any available technology.100  In a 
crowded market, even the onetime “pirates” became zealous 
guardians of their intellectual property, particularly when their 
revenues dropped, as suggested by the experience of Apple.101 
While software company investments are not highly 
sensitive to the quality of enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, the software industry does have a stake in improved 
enforcement of these rights because their infringement affects 
their research and development costs in the U.S.  The majority 
of software companies take four years or longer to achieve 
profitability.  Research supported by the Inter-American  
Development Bank reveals that fewer than one third of 
software developers with revenues of $10 million or less will 
accept a development project that will not generate significant 
revenues within two years.102  Illegal copying can have a 
dramatic impact on the financial well-being of these companies. 
The following table ranks the ten countries with the 
highest dollar losses due to software piracy103: 
 
 
 
 
 99. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS, APPENDIX 295 (1996) (revealing that between 1960 and 1994, 
7,661 software companies were formed in the U.S.; of these, 5,196 were 
established after 1980). 
 100. See LINZMAYER, supra note 66, at 72 (stating that Apple’s Steve Jobs 
had direct oversight of the Macintosh project. Jobs referred to his group as 
“pirates”, and in keeping with that spirit began systematically raiding other 
projects, some of which were even under Apple tutelage, for key technologies.  
A member of the team stated that, “we looked for any place where we could 
beg, borrow or steal code”). 
 101. See id. at 202-03 (stating that after Gilbert F. Amelio became 
Chairman and CEO of Apple in February, 1995, he favored licensing Apple’s 
technology and within two weeks of being appointed initiated licensing the 
system 7.5X and Copland to the Motorola Computer Group.  In late May, 
UMAX Data Systems Inc., a Taiwanese manufacturer of scanners purchased a 
Mac License. Apple net sales peaked in 1995 at $11 billion and steadily 
declined to $6 billion in 1998.  Steve Jobs replaced Amelio in 1997, who 
strongly opposed licensing and referred to Mac cloners as “leeches”). 
 102. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 16, at 20. 
 103. See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, 1997, 
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY REPORT 3 (1998). 
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Table 4 
 
Ten Countries with Highest Losses Due to Software Piracy 
(U.S. Dollars) 
 
Country Total dollar loss Piracy rate 
U.S. $2.8 billion 27% 
China $1.4 billion 96% 
Japan $0.8 billion 32% 
Korea $0.6 billion 67% 
Germany $0.5 billion 33% 
France $0.4 billion 44% 
Brazil $0.4 billion 62% 
Italy $0.3 billion 43% 
Canada $0.3 billion 39% 
U.K. $0.3 billion 31% 
 
Total losses for these countries were $7.3 billion, or sixty-
seven percent of worldwide losses.  Even in the country with 
the lowest rate of piracy, the U.S., more than one in four 
applications are pirated.104 
At the regional level, North America, Asia-Pacific, and 
Western Europe account for eighty percent of the total revenue 
losses of the software industry.  The Asia-Pacific region has the 
second highest dollar losses, after North America.  In the Asia-
Pacific region, total losses of $3 billion were estimated for 1998, 
down from $3.9 billion in 1997.105  Latin American countries 
with the largest revenue losses in 1998 include Brazil ($367 
million), Mexico ($147 million), and Argentina ($124 million).  
Combined, these three countries represent sixty percent of the 
region’s dollar losses, corresponding to the sixty-five percent of 
 
 104. See id. at 10 (stating that the difference between software applications 
installed (demand) and software applications legally shipped (supply) equals 
the estimate of software applications pirated.  These were calculated by 
country for 1997.  The piracy rate was defined as the amount of software 
pirated as a percent of total software installed in 1997 for each country.  By 
using the average price information from the collected data, the legal and 
pirated software revenue was calculated.  This is a wholesale price estimate 
weighed by the amount of shipments within each software application 
category). 
 105. See id. at 3 (stating that the countries with the highest rates in the 
Asia-Pacific region were Vietnam (97%), China (95%), and Indonesia (92%).  
Countries with the highest dollar losses were China ($1.2 billion), Japan ($597 
million), and Korea ($198 million)). 
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the business software market these countries represent.  While 
the overall piracy rate in Latin America declined by two 
percentage points in 1998, more than 17.7 million applications 
were pirated in the region during 1998, resulting in an overall 
piracy rate of sixty-two percent.106 
Section 2.5 provided evidence in support of the view that 
there is a weak relationship between the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights of the software industry and 
overseas investment in software research and development.  
This section has sought to explain that software companies do 
have a stake in improved enforcement of these rights.  For the 
companies, improved enforcement has the objective of offsetting 
investors’ inability to realize sufficient benefits from their 
investments in new software technology; which is the 
underlying rationale of patents and copyrights as policy 
instruments.107  International efforts to strengthen enforcement 
of intellectual property rights are guided by the same logic. 
The next section will argue that developing countries have 
participated in international efforts to strengthen intellectual 
property protection by improving the rules and their 
enforcement with dramatically different expectations than the 
U.S. software companies.  The governments of developing 
countries are assuming that their efforts to improve intellectual 
property protection will be rewarded with overseas 
investments.  The absence of these investments contributes to 
their low political commitment to improve enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  This makes international efforts 
particularly vulnerable because their cornerstone is public 
enforcement of rights by local authorities.  It is plausible that 
these limitations can be overcome if developing countries 
believe that enforcement of intellectual property rights will 
stimulate their local software industries.  International actors 
can take steps in this direction by providing assistance to local 
software suppliers to defend their intellectual property rights 
and develop associations of software suppliers. 
 
 106. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 16, at 26 
(stating that the countries with the highest piracy rates continue to be El 
Salvador and Bolivia (both with 87%), followed by Paraguay and Guatemala 
(each with 85%).  Brazil, the largest country in the region has a piracy rate of 
61%, falling just one percentage point from 62% in 1997.  The region remains 
well above the 25% piracy rate target set by the Inter-American Development 
Bank). 
 107. See FREDERIK M. SCHERER, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 59 (1999). 
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III.     HOW THE WEAK RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS IN SOFTWARE RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT, TRADE SECRET, AND TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
AFFECTS OVERSEAS COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
This section explains why developing countries are not 
fully committed to improving enforcement of copyright, 
trademark, and trade secret protection.  It also highlights some 
of the strategies followed by some of these countries to avoid 
improving enforcement and comments on their consequences. 
Multilateral institutions108 and policymakers in developing 
countries, such as Brazil109 and Mexico,110 expected that 
improved intellectual property protection would increase 
investment flows in the software and other high-tech 
industries.  To date, there is little evidence supporting the 
responsiveness of investment to this signal, but there is a 
widespread and growing belief in its importance.  Even poor 
countries with limited technical capabilities, including 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam unilaterally 
strengthened their enforcement of intellectual property rights 
in the past decade.111 
Posner argues that economic constraints lead governments 
to establish enforcement priorities.112  It follows that 
governments will intensify efforts in the industries where the 
economic benefits of enforcement improvements are significant.  
 
 108. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 16, at 20 
(stating that local software publishers are unwilling to invest in research and 
development when there is a significant amount of software piracy.  Strong 
national intellectual property protection creates an investment-friendly 
environment that in turn promotes research and development.  An important 
obstacle to the globalization of software research and development is the 
ineffective protection of intellectual property) 
 109. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 403 (stating that the Cardoso 
administration sought to stimulate investment by reducing trade barriers and 
introducing legislation to the Brazilian Congress requiring heightened 
protection of patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret rights). 
 110. See George Y. Gonzalez, Symposium on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement: An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual 
Property Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement,  34 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 305, 316 (1993) (arguing that increased foreign investment was a 
primary goal of 1991 legislative changes to provide intellectual property  
protection to software). 
 111. See Maskus, supra note 58, at 138. 
 112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 564 (1986). 
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Software protection is not a high priority for local authorities 
because improved enforcement of the rights of the software 
industry will not stimulate overseas investments in research 
and development in their home countries.  Governments might 
still have the economic incentive of protecting software to avoid 
U.S. trade sanctions,113 or to obtain a favorable U.S. response to 
a policy initiative, such as NAFTA ratification in the case of 
Mexico,114 or WTO membership for China.115  However, these 
incentives are short lived and lead to an inconsistent pattern of 
improvements in intellectual property protection. 
Past experience reveals that without the benefits of 
overseas investments, developing countries tend to maneuver 
around U.S. efforts to improve intellectual property protection.  
The U.S.T.R. review process relies heavily on changes in formal 
rules.116  Political commitment is weak in the absence of 
overseas investments, and policymakers from developing 
countries often resort to formal rule changes to prevent trade 
sanctions with minimal efforts to improve enforcement.  
Though Brazil,117 China,118 Mexico,119 Thailand, and Taiwan 
 
 113. See Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long 
Term Protection for US Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
29, 47 (1995) (stating that the BSA worked with the Indonesian government in 
a raid on printers.  The raids resulted in confiscation of more than 17,000 
illegally printed computer software manuals.  The reason for the cooperation 
was that the U.S.T.R. was hinting at upgrading Indonesia on the Special 301 
lists). 
 114. See Amy R. Edge, Preventing Software Piracy Through Regional Trade 
Agreements: The Mexican Example, 29 N.C. J. INT’L LAW & COM. 175, 198-99 
(1994) (stating that during the NAFTA negotiations, the Mexican government 
increased protection for software to assure U.S. manufacturers of its good 
faith. Several different steps were taken.  First, the government and the 
National Association of Computer Program Industry (ANIPCO), the domestic 
group that represents the interests of software producers, began a campaign to 
educate the public about software piracy.  Second, the government established 
a special division within the Attorney General’s office to investigate companies 
suspected of engaging in software piracy.  Finally, the government, in 
conjunction with ANIPCO, began raiding the offices of companies, which were 
believed to be using pirated software). 
 115. See Fonda Y. Duvanel, The Evolution and Enforcement of Computer 
Software Copyright in the People’s Republic of China, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 337, 403 (1996) (suggesting that the desire of the People’s 
Republic of China to be admitted to the WTO creates strong incentives for this 
country to begin to fully enforce its copyright laws). 
 116. See United States Trade Representative, supra note 17 (revealing that 
from May of 1995 to April of 1996, the U.S.T.R. reported sixty developments in 
intellectual property rights.  Only nine of these developments focus on 
enforcement of rights.  The remaining are changes in regulations). 
 117. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 376-77 (arguing that the high rate of 
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have engaged in formal rule changes, their commitment to 
enforcement is questionable: 
(1)  According to U.S. Senator Max Baucus, the result of 
trade negotiations with China was “the most important Special 
301 victory to date.”120  However, software piracy in China 
generated losses for the U.S. industry of $1.4 billion in 1997, 
and the piracy rate was ninety-six percent.121 
(2)  In April of 1995, Brazil was placed on an intermediary 
watch list.122  The U.S.T.R. felt, judging from its failure to take 
a stringent stance towards Brazil, that the country was making 
excellent strides towards strengthening its protection of 
intellectual property rights, and no further U.S. action was 
necessary.123  This view is contradicted by a recent study, which 
revealed that Brazil is among the ten countries with the 
highest losses due to piracy.124 
(3)  In 1997, sixty-two percent of all software applications 
in use in Mexico were counterfeit, a significantly higher rate 
than the forty percent world piracy figure for that year.125 
(4)  Thailand was listed as a Priority Watch Country in 
1990 and 1991.  This led the government of Thailand to amend 
its laws on intellectual property to meet international 
standards.  Despite the formal rule changes, losses from 
pirated software cost U.S. companies more than $25 million in 
1991, $49 million in 1992, and $75 million in 1993.  The piracy 
rate in Thailand was estimated to be around eighty-four 
percent in 1997,126 more than double the corresponding world 
 
computer software piracy does not reflect an absence of legislation.  The 1987 
software law provides the judicial means, at least on paper, by which software 
publishers may combat violations of their product copyright.  This law 
provides for fines as well as criminal prosecution). 
 118. See Ansson, supra note 21, at 7-8 (stating that China has promulgated 
numerous rules to heighten intellectual property protection, including: (1) the 
Technological Contract Law of China; (2) the Regulation on the Protection of 
Computer Software; (3) the Law of Scientific and Technological Progress of 
China; and (4) the Law on Combating Unfair Competition). 
 119. Established copyright protection for software in 1991 and joined 
NAFTA in 1993. 
 120. Newby, supra note 113, at 42-43. 
 121. See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra 
note 103, at 6. 
 122. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 411. 
 123. See id. at 410-11. 
 124. See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra 
note 103, at 3. 
 125. See id. at 6. 
 126. See id. 
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figure. 
(5)  Taiwan was taken off the priority watch list in May 
1991, after authorities promised to enact intellectual property 
legislation and to establish an unprecedented inspection system 
aimed at stopping counterfeit software.  By 1992, however, 
Taiwan had not made sufficient efforts to abide by the 1989 
agreement and was reinstated in the priority watch list.127  A 
recent study placed Taiwan’s software piracy rate at sixty-three 
percent in 1997.128  This is about the same rate as Mexico, 
another Special 301 target. 
BSA raids face the same shortcomings as the threat of 
trade sanctions.  It would be expected that as the threat of 
trade sanctions come and go, so does the motivation of local 
authorities to commit to BSA raids on infringers.  An additional 
setback of the raids is that they are not cost effective.129  An 
ongoing program in China suggests that the BSA and 
authorities from both the U.S. and the host country can 
strengthen international collaboration to verify the legality of 
software.130  The preliminary results of the system are not 
available yet, however, it shows promise to reduce 
administrative barriers to the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in developing countries.  Currently, China is 
seeking WTO membership, which might be influencing the 
government’s commitment to this effort. 
This section has highlighted some of the consequences of 
the lack of political commitment in developing countries to 
 
 127. See Newby, supra note 113, at 39. 
 128. See INTERNATIONAL PLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, supra 
note 103, at 6. 
 129. See Duvanel, supra note 115, at 391 (arguing that a raid against five 
Beijing-based computer companies  for copyright infringement took months of 
preparation and thousands of dollars to mount.  Because few software 
copyright owners would be able to conduct or finance these investigations, it is 
likely that most foreign software copyright owners will have to rely on the 
courts to identify and obtain evidence sufficient to establish infringements of 
their rights). 
 130. See Ansson, supra note 21, at 13 (stating that in late April of 1997, the 
United States Information Technology Office finalized a contract to perform 
verification services in China on behalf of the U.S. software industry.  The 
software title verification system will allow software companies from the U.S. 
to monitor Chinese CD-ROM plants.  Under the system, requests will be 
reviewed by the National Copyright Administration in the U.S. and then 
processed through the Software Title Verification Office.  The BSA will then 
determine whether a particular order is legitimate, with illegitimate orders 
triggering investigations and enforcement procedures by the Chinese 
government). 
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improved enforcement of intellectual property rights.  The 
weak relationship between overseas investment in research 
and development and improvement in enforcing intellectual 
property rights affects this commitment, producing a pattern of 
short-term policies often designed to reduce the threat of trade 
sanctions.  Despite technological innovations,131 software 
companies still depend on public enforcement to protect their 
intellectual property rights.  Sustained efforts to improve 
enforcement depend on long-term economic gains for 
developing countries.  The next section explores the extent and 
conditions under which local software suppliers can play a role 
in achieving sustained improvements in the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and how international policies can 
be aligned with the interests of these actors. 
 
IV.     INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT 
 
If improved enforcement of copyright, trademark, and 
trade secret rights is not a direct determinant of offshore 
software investment, then what incentives do developing 
countries have to protect software from piracy?  This section 
will argue that developing a local software industry provides 
the incentive that local authorities need to improve 
enforcement of copyright, trade secret, and trademark 
protection.  Local software suppliers support improved 
enforcement of copyright, trade secret, and trademark 
protection following their economic interests.  International 
actors can contribute to boosting the position of these suppliers 
so that they can become effective promoters of enforcement.  
The success of these efforts will be more likely if local 
authorities adopt policies that encourage the development of 
local software suppliers.  Section A discusses how software 
piracy affects local software suppliers.  The next section 
highlights strategies that the BSA and U.S. software 
 
 131. See Kory D. Christensen, Fighting Software Piracy in Cyberspace: 
Legal and Technical Solutions, 28 LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
435, 467-68 (1997) (stating that companies have explored the use of 
technological alternatives such as scrambling readable text in their programs 
to make it unreadable (encryption).  Until recently, the processing  overhead 
required to unscramble text (decryption) in real time was prohibitive.  With 
the development of faster computers, the science of cryptography can now be 
applied to many new applications.  One such application is encrypting 
computer programs to protect them from piracy.  However, the bulk of 
commercial software is not encrypted). 
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companies can follow to assist local company efforts to improve 
enforcement.  Finally, Section 5.3 explores domestic policy 
orientations that overseas authorities can follow to contribute 
to the development of a local software industry by addressing 
the needs of existing local suppliers. 
 
A. THE IMPACT OF PIRACY ON LOCAL SOFTWARE SUPPLIERS 
 
Recent studies assess the impact of software piracy on 
sales, jobs, and tax revenues in developing countries.132  This 
diffuse economic impact is the underlying rationale to improve 
enforcement. However, this impact needs to be translated into 
specific economic shortcomings for the domestic actors that are 
capable of promoting stronger enforcement, such as the 
domestic software producers.  What makes these actors 
potential partners for international actors seeking to improve 
overseas intellectual property protection is that they are 
particularly vulnerable to counterfeiting and they are already 
active promoters of stronger enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and are improving their organization and 
engaging in litigation. 
Even though piracy affects all parties in the software 
distribution channel, the experiences of China133 and Mexico134 
 
 132. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 16, at 1-3 
(estimating that the packaged software industry generated $3.54 billion in 
sales, 137,345 jobs and $1.24 billion in tax revenues throughout Latin America 
in 1998.  Based on average market growth projections of 18% per year, the 
Bank predicts that this segment of the information technology industry will 
produce total employment of 193,735 and fiscal revenues of $2.40 billion by 
2002.  Complete eradication of software piracy may be difficult, but a 
reduction from 62% to 25% would have significant “multiplier” effects on the 
economic contribution of the packaged software industry.  If the piracy rate in 
Latin America had been reduced to 25% in 1998, the economic contribution of 
this sector would have been approximately 150% greater.  There would have 
been an estimated $5.32 billion more sales, 206,391 more jobs and $1.86 
billion more in annual tax revenues throughout the Latin American 
economies). 
 133. See Bien, supra note 22, at 32-39 (detailing how the Wang Ma 
Computer Company obtained the rights to the five-stroke input method for 
Chinese characters.  In accordance with this method, selected keys represent 
basic brush strokes.  By typing the brush stroke keys in a specific order, the 
desired character appears.  A skilled user can type up to 250 characters per 
minute compared to 15-25 using pinyin.  China’s ineffective enforcement of 
copyright law encouraged other Chinese software companies, as well as Hope, 
Stone and Richsite to incorporate the five-stroke method in their programs 
without an agreement with Wang Ma, placing this company on the verge of 
bankruptcy). 
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reveal that it may have its greatest impact on the growth and 
development of local software developers and publishers.  Since 
they cannot compete against pirated software, it is very 
difficult for local firms to develop and launch new software 
packages in markets where piracy is rampant.135 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST LOCAL SOFTWARE `
 SUPPLIERS AGAINST SOFTWARE PIRACY 
 
Many nascent software companies in developing countries 
have modest resources and cannot defend their rights in court 
against piracy.  In contrast, the BSA initiates litigation around 
the world in defense of its member’s proprietary rights in their 
creations.  The BSA efforts have proven successful.136  The BSA 
could broaden their efforts and finance litigation on behalf of 
domestic software companies seeking to stop piracy. 
How would defending local companies further the interests 
of the U.S. software industry?  In countries facing rampant 
piracy, it is particularly important that courts set precedents of 
intellectual property protection, regardless of the nationality of 
the software company.  This contributes to changes in the 
attitudes towards intellectual property protection.  In addition, 
BSA support for local software companies is a way to get 
around the nationalist bias found in some courts that has 
proven to be a barrier to the U.S. software industry.137 
 
 134. See Edge, supra note 114, at 175 (stating that the Mexican domestic 
software industry suffered losses estimated between $250 and $260 million in 
1992, due to the illegal copying of software.  The value of the legal software 
market was estimated at $210 million in 1991, thus, losses suffered were 
greater than the market’s entire value). 
 135. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 16, at 23. 
 136. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 412 (stating that the Court of Appeals of 
the State of Sao Paulo upheld a previous decision favorable to a BSA member).  
The Court of Appeals decision represented the first civil appellate decision in 
Brazil regarding computer software.  See id. at n.289. 
 137. See generally Bien, supra note 22 (stating that in the case of China, 
U.S. software companies have faced problems of unwillingness of courts to 
carry out procedures and to award more than symbolic amounts in damages, 
as exemplified in three particular court disputes.  IFPI v. Huale showed how 
some Chinese courts condone duplicitous attempts to reject culpability.  The 
defendants accused of copyright infringement claimed they were not guilty 
because Taiwanese criminals were using them.  The courts found their 
explanation satisfactory and pressured IFPI to accept it as well.  Suntendy v. 
Taisen revealed how some Chinese courts use ambiguities of the damage 
provisions in China’s copyright laws to avoid levying substantial penalties.  
Beijing’s Intermediate People’s Court  awarded damages based on miniscule 
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However, efforts to change attitudes towards enforcement 
of intellectual property rights through litigation may be 
perceived as predatory by the population.  Additionally, their 
immediate impact is circumscribed to particular disputes.  An 
alternative to litigation is to strengthen the cooperation 
between the BSA and local associations with similar goals, such 
as the Taiwanese Information Product Anti-Piracy Union.  The 
Union is aimed at intensifying crackdowns on counterfeit 
computer products and is patterned after the BSA.  At present, 
more than thirty Taiwanese computer software manufacturers 
have joined the Union.  The BSA and local associations can 
jointly encourage authorities to strengthen enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.  In support of this effort, some BSA 
resources could be diverted from engaging investigators and 
attorneys to police the world to financing work with domestic 
organizations to meet their local needs as well as targeting U.S. 
Alliance member concerns. 
In Western Europe, the BSA regularly organizes, conducts, 
coordinates, and participates in intellectual property training 
for courts, prosecutors, and specialized police units at the BSA’s 
expense.  In a recent report, the BSA stated that it was 
“interested in and willing to participate in the preparation and 
conduct of further such training programs in the future.  
Because the copyright sectors’ problems differ substantially, 
training modules from each of the major copyright industries, 
particularly the software industry, are needed.”138  Similar 
undertakings can be carried out in developing countries.  This 
would allow the communities to see the BSA engaged in 
activities other than raids and litigation.  Local software 
supplier associations should monitor progress and evaluate 
these training programs to avoid nationalist sentiments 
stemming from direct BSA involvement. 
The protection of U.S. research and development spending 
against piracy can be improved if local software suppliers 
 
amounts.  Suntendy sought 3.5 million-Yuan for its economic losses due to 
software misappropriation yet received only 200 thousand-Yuan.  Microsoft v. 
Juren highlighted the problems of damage assessment and documents the 
obstacles that foreign litigants face.  Microsoft, Lotus and Autodesk filed a 
complaint with the Beijing Number One Intermediate Intellectual Property 
People’s Court on October 12, 1994 against Juren who was accused of 
frequently giving counterfeit software to customers who had purchased a 
personal computer.  The Court acted irregularly and delayed conducting raids 
on the infringer’s facilities.  The actual damages received by plaintiffs 
amounted to $48 thousand dollars, well below the attorneys’ fees). 
 138. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 56, at 94. 
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become promoters of improved intellectual property 
enforcement.  The effectiveness of these actors depends on their 
financial well-being.  These companies are eager to design and 
develop software for distribution in the U.S. market.139  U.S. 
companies can support these local suppliers by establishing 
joint ventures between U.S. and local firms or outsourcing of 
U.S. based projects to local contractors.140 
 
C. POLICY ORIENTATIONS TO DEVELOP A SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
 
At the domestic level, governments need to focus on the 
requirements of software suppliers, which fall into three basic 
categories: (1) human capital; (2) adequate business practices; 
and (3) financial incentives for research and development. 
Human capital in the software industry takes the form of 
science and engineering graduates.141  Without adequate 
incentives, programmers will seek employment in the U.S.142  
The following table highlights the extent of the problem:143 
 
Table 5 
 
Percentage of Foreign-born 1992 U.S. Doctoral Recipients from 
Selected Countries Planning to Remain in the U.S. 
 
National origin Engineering degrees 
China 87.1  
Taiwan 50.2  
Japan 24.0  
South Korea 29.9  
India 82.9  
 
 139. The U.S. market is relevant to the local software suppliers because: a) 
its size can generate attractive revenues for offshore software producers, and, 
b) it is highly competitive, which can in turn stimulate improved quality of 
offshore produced software. 
 140. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 137 (presenting an 
overview of these arrangements in India). 
 141. See Patel & Pavitt, supra note 60, at 314 (arguing that countries with 
a strong endowment of science and engineering graduates, but a badly 
educated workforce can specialize in fields like drugs and software, where the 
skills of the general workforce are not critical). 
 142. See id. at 137 (revealing that a typical programmer in India with 
three years of experience might earn $200; approximately ten times less than 
his or her U.S. counterpart). 
 143. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 2-34. 
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United Kingdom 82.4  
Canada 58.7  
Germany 55.6  
France 40.0  
Spain 50.0  
 
U.S. companies have had openings for more than 1.6 
million information technology workers in the year 2000.  Less 
than half of them were filled.144  Current U.S. immigration 
policy fosters the retention of computer scientists to meet the 
demand.145  U.S. analysts are encouraged by these 
developments and perceive a functional need in the U.S. for the 
foreign-born software developers.146  In 1993, foreign students 
obtained thirty-four percent of the master’s degrees in 
computer science and forty-four percent of the doctoral degrees 
in this field.  About thirty percent of the graduates received 
firm offers to remain in the U.S.147  The retention rates for 
students from India and the People’s Republic of China were 
well above average, and the combined immigration from the 
two countries accounted for 37.9 percent of all science and 
technology immigrants.148  This is particularly ominous for 
these two countries because they are trying to develop local 
software industries for which English-trained programmers are 
valuable assets.149  This problem is of concern in the Indian 
information industry.150 
 
 144. See Ballon, supra note 86, at C1. 
 145. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 2-34 (revealing that 
despite an overall decline in immigration to the U.S. in 1993, the admission of 
scientists and engineers continued to rise.  According to INS data, 23,534 
scientists and engineers were admitted to the U.S. on permanent visas in 
1993.  Mathematical scientist and computer specialists accounted for nearly 
half of the permanent visas). 
 146. See FERGUSON, supra note 76, at 255 (arguing that the immigration 
service frequently forces highly qualified foreigners doing important work to 
leave the country when their visas expire.  From the admittedly narrow 
perspective of U.S. technological self-interest, there would be great dividends 
from a broad policy of skill-based waivers of standard policies and quotas). 
 147. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at xxxix. 
 148. See id. at 2-34. 
 149. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 94 (stating that 
most software continues to be English-based and firms with all operations in 
English may have more of an advantage in the U.S. market than a firm with 
some operations in another language.  Customers find only English-language 
computer interface but also customer assistance, reference manuals and all 
correspondence with the company in English). 
 150. See Ganesh Natarajan, The Software Product Odyssey, COMPUTERS 
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 The recent opinions of representatives of software 
companies such as Focus Software International and GoldMine 
Software Corp. suggest that U.S. immigration policy can have 
an impact on overseas investments in research and 
development.  The existing target of 115,000 special visas for 
skilled foreign workers is short of industry expectations.  This 
is pushing software companies to hire overseas subcontractors. 
151  Increased demand of overseas software design and 
development can ameliorate the immigration trend.  As 
opportunities to work at the technological cutting edge expand 
in newly industrialized and industrializing countries, they will 
likely affect the ability of the U.S. to attract and retain top 
science and engineering talent currently readily available to 
U.S. businesses, universities, and the government.152  The 
indispensable conditions to stimulate local demand for talent 
include improvements in business practices of local suppliers 
and the development of a financial structure to fund research 
and development. 
 For the most part, offshore subcontractors have been 
inefficient in promoting their services, both within their own 
countries and abroad.153  The subcontractors that manage to get 
the attention of U.S. companies find that offshore investments 
are influenced by their (1) positive and negative corporate 
characteristics; (2) methodologies; (3) management 
philosophies; (4) ethical standards; (5) facilities; and (6) 
financial stability.154  U.S. companies that have hired Indian 
software development firms are more concerned with security 
and communication issues than with technical competence, 
cost, quality, or productivity.155 
The majority of Indian software companies do not have any 
direct sales force and thus act as subcontractors to software 
contractors or middlemen in the marketplace.  They have 
 
TODAY, Oct. 1, 1997 (stating that the current generation of trained 
professionals clearly prefers the promise of immediate riches and status that 
beckons them from the U.S. and other global destinations.  While the 
manpower supply problem may still be resolved with students from the 
private training institutions, the difficulties of retaining and motivating talent 
will continue to plague the industry, particularly the startups, for the 
foreseeable future). 
 151. See Ballon, supra note 86, at C4. 
 152. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 6-30. 
 153. See INTERNATIONAL DATA CORPORATION, supra note 40, at 4. 
 154. See id. at 7. 
 155. See id. at 6. 
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almost no brand equity in the marketplace.  Rarely are they in 
touch with the ultimate customer.  Thus, they are not able to 
predict their future revenues and are at the mercy of the 
middlemen who will replace them if they find a cheaper 
alternative.  The current sales model for the offshore work 
results in such low margins for the offshore operations that 
very few companies can make major investments in sales, 
infrastructure, training, technology, or tools.  The Chairman of 
Infosys Technologies Ltd., Bangalore stated that the inability 
to invest adequately in these areas by Indian subcontractors is 
likely to render them unfit for competition in the international 
marketplace.156 
Government spending is a key stimulant of research and 
development in the U.S. and in other industrialized countries.  
In addition to providing more resources for research and 
development than Canada, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Japan combined, the U.S. government is a major 
purchaser of software.157  Corporate spending on research and 
development has also been instrumental in the development of 
the U.S. information industry.  IBM158 and Microsoft159 provide 
clear examples of company commitment to research and 
development.  The following table presents the top twenty 
information technology firms worldwide by research and 
development intensity, measured in terms of research and 
 
 156. See N.R. Narayana Murthy, Can We Make Indian MNCs?, 
COMPUTERS TODAY, July 19, 1998, at 112. 
 157. See SIWEK & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 10, at 95 (revealing that 
the U.S. government remains a major purchaser of software, accounting for an 
estimated 21% of software sales in 1991. Government demand has particularly 
helped U.S. firms.  Although federal, state and local governments do not 
generally prohibit licensing foreign generated software, they may still tend to 
favor U.S. firms in government contracting, particularly for security related 
projects.  With more than 20% of the U.S. market, government contracts 
represent a significant portion of all software business). 
 158. See FERGUSON supra note 76, at 5 (stating that when Tom Watson Jr. 
took control of IBM in the mid-1950s, he consciously set out to push the 
company into the newest electronic technologies.  He recruited Emanuel Piore, 
head of the office of naval research, as chief scientist, and increased research 
spending from about 15% of net income in the 1940’s to 35% in the 1950s and 
to 50% by the 1960s and 1970s). 
 159. See STROSS, supra note 1, at 128 (highlighting how stock analysts in 
the 1980s noticed that Microsoft, though not the largest software company, led 
the industry in research and development.  Even when Microsoft’s growth 
seemed to slow, research and development were protected. In 1986 for 
example, more than one fourth of all new hires were assigned to research and 
development projects). 
46 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
development spending as a percentage of sales:160 
 
Table 6 
 
Research and Development Spending of the Top Ten 
Information Technology Firms 
 
Firm Country of origin R&D spending as % of sales 
Adobe Systems U.S. 18.2% 
Cray Research U.S. 18.2% 
Novell U.S. 18.0% 
Advanced Micro Devices U.S. 16.4% 
Lotus Development U.S. 16.4% 
SAP Germany 16.3% 
Ericsson Sweden 15.3% 
Northern Telecom Canada 14.8% 
Microsoft U.S. 14.5% 
Analog Devices U.S. 14.3% 
Tandem Computers U.S. 14.2% 
DSC Communications U.S. 13.4% 
National Semiconductor U.S. 11.9% 
Silicon Graphics U.S. 11.1% 
Storage Technology U.S. 10.5% 
Teradyne U.S. 10.4% 
Bay Networks U.S. 10.4% 
Amdahl U.S. 9.9% 
3Com U.S. 9.8% 
Intel U.S. 9.6% 
 
Packaged software publishers, those that produce software 
that is sold in a standard form to all customers and is not 
specifically written or adapted to a particular user’s 
requirements, cluster at the top of the previous list. 
Developing countries and local software suppliers cannot 
match these expenditures and must maximize their position 
given these constraints.  Among the options available to 
developing countries to stimulate research and development 
are government incentives for local software developers, 
emulation of U.S. venture capital strategies, and acquisition of 
small U.S. software companies. 
 
 160. See id. at 19. 
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The U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Program is a 
useful reference point for policy makers in developing countries 
seeking to stimulate software development.  The program was 
created in 1982 to strengthen the role of small firms in 
federally funded research and development.  Since that time, 
the program has directed nearly 29,000 awards worth almost 
$4 billion in research and development support to thousands of 
qualified small high-tech companies on a competitive basis.  
Projects in computer information, processing, and analysis 
receive the largest share of the awards, accounting for twenty-
one percent of the resources. 
To obtain funding, a company applies for a phase I grant.  
The proposed project must meet an agency’s research needs 
and have commercial potential.  If approved, grants of up to 
$100,000 are made to allow the scientific and technical merit 
and feasibility of an idea to be evaluated. If the concept shows 
potential, the company can receive a phase II grant of up to 
$750,000 to develop the idea further.  In phase III, the 
innovation must be brought to market with private sector 
investment and support.161 
Developing countries can propel technological progress by 
successfully emulating U.S. venture capital approaches.  
Venture capital has been instrumental for the financial 
survival of major companies, particularly in their early stages 
of development.162  The overseas software suppliers can be 
attractive to venture capitalists because of their small size.163  
However, the absence or limited presence of the human capital 
indispensable for the success of venture capital projects offsets 
this advantage.  Particularly concerning the following 
prominent actors in these ventures: (1) a class of investors who 
understand the rules, risks, and rewards of venture capitalism; 
(2) financial intermediaries who are at ease in the world of 
technology as well as in the domains of money and 
management; and (3) a class of technologists willing to accept 
 
 161. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 4-19. 
 162. See LINZMAYER, supra note 66, at 4. (mentioning that after selling 
fifty Apple I computers, Apple co-founder Steve Jobs contracted Mike Markula 
to secure a $250,000 credit line from Bank of America.  At the time, Apple had 
made roughly an $8,000 profit). 
 163. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 201 (1975) (arguing that outside venture 
capital may be specifically earmarked for investment in high-risk inventive 
activities for which investor appropriability is substantial.  Large firms, as 
usually constituted, are not calculated to attract such sources of funds). 
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the risk of advancing new ideas in which they have faith.164 
In the case of India, in spite of some successful venture 
capital efforts,165 the overall results have been modest.  Lack of 
attention by policymakers and the multiplicity of regulators 
like the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have been blamed for this 
situation.  Faced with difficulties in raising funds, venture 
capitalist are demanding that pension funds, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds be allowed to invest about five 
percent of their corpus in venture capital funds with a proven 
track record, in line with the U.S. and other developed 
countries.  Ravindra Gupta, Secretary of the Department of 
Electronics doubts whether it will work at all.  “There is no 
cooperation.  The environment for venture capitalism is 
missing.  We inflate our projects, do not pay back. This has 
made the Indian banking system very reluctant and wary of 
investing.”166 
The acquisition of existing software companies can provide 
fast transfers of technology to the acquiring firm while 
facilitating easier market access for its own technologies.  The 
following table contains the countries that have been involved 
in these efforts:167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 164. See SCHERER, supra note 107, at 122. 
 165. See Sudha Nagaraj, Floating Ventures, Hunting Money, COMPUTERS 
TODAY, Feb. 15, 1998, at 49 (stating that in December 1997, the private equity 
fund Indocean Chase Capital Advisors placed its first start-up bet on Suresh 
Rajpal, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard India Ltd.  Rajpal now heads E-
Commerce Solutions, a Bermuda based start-up capitalized at $8 million.  
Techspan, a new U.S. based software consultancy firm led by HCL founder 
Arjun Malhotra, is being backed with an investment of $12 million by 
Goldman Sachs and Walden International Investment Group, an international 
venture capital fund. WIIG, which operates through Walden Nikko India 
Management Co. Ltd., has a $23 million fund focused on investment 
opportunities in India.  Global investment major Jardine Fleming holds a 
twenty-five percent stake in Fujistu’s Indian venture, International 
Computers India Ltd.). 
 166. Id. at 52. 
 167. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 9, at 296. 
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Table 7 
 
Ownership of Software Establishments Operating 
in the U.S. 
 
Total 7,916 
United States 7,575 
United Kingdom 119 
Japan 30 
Germany 19 
France 34 
Switzerland 13 
Canada 52 
Sweden 6 
The Netherlands 18 
Singapore 4 
South Korea 1 
 
Singapore and South Korea own relatively few of the 
software establishments.  Still, their focus is well defined.  
These countries are building an information industry by 
complementing their software companies with the acquisition 
of U.S. computer hardware companies.168  In addition, they are 
concentrating their patenting activities in computer storage, 
computer display, information storage devices, and other 
computer peripheral equipment.169  Taiwan, and to a lesser 
extent, China, are attempting to implement similar strategies.  
Alternatively, companies such as Calcutta-based Globsyn 
Group have decided to set up wholly owned subsidiaries in 
industrialized countries such as the U.S. and U.K.170 
 This article has highlighted some of the challenges that 
local software producers face to pressure local authorities to 
improve public enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
These actors would benefit from the alignment of international 
efforts to improve intellectual property protection with their 
needs. Local suppliers need all the help they can get.  However, 
in many countries they are at an early stage of development 
and their fate is dependent on the political will of local 
authorities.  If local suppliers can get their governments to 
 
 168. See id. at  6-29. 
 169. See id. at  6-22. 
 170. See COMPUTERS TODAY, May 19, 1998, at 20. 
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place their needs on the political agenda and give a high 
priority to the development of a national software industry, 
then they would have contributed more to improve overseas 
enforcement of copyright, trademark, and trade secret rights of 
software companies than the current international strategies. 
